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Abstract
The Preˆt a` Voter end-to-end verifiable voting sys-
tem makes use of receipts, retained by voters, to
provide individual verifiability that their vote has
been recorded as cast. The paper discusses issues
around the production and acceptance of receipts,
and presents an alternative approach to individual
verifiability based on Authentication Codes. These
codes are constructed, in the encrypted domain, by
the peered Web Bulletin Board when the vote is cast,
and provide the voter with an assurance that their
vote has been properly received. The approach is de-
signed to work in a uniform way with ranked elections
and single preference elections.
1 Introduction
A number of different Preˆt a` Voter schemes have been
proposed over the years [2][11][10], however, they all
share a common receipt scheme. Primarily, the re-
ceipt contains a digital signature, provided either by
the booth scanner or more commonly by the Web
Bulletin Board (WBB). The receipt, which the voter
gets, has a barcode of some sort (more recently 2D)
that contains the digital signature. The purpose of
this digital signature is twofold: first it should protect
the WBB from malicious voters wrongly accusing the
WBB of cheating and second it should provide assur-
ance to the voter that the receipt she has received
is genuine and can be used to challenge the election
if she feels this is necessary. However, in the partic-
ular scenario of electronic voting the receiver of the
signed message, the voter, has no trusted equipment
available to verify the signature.
In [6] the issue of malformed digital signatures go-
ing unchecked was raised in relation to both [3] and
[7], both of which are DRE (Direct Recording Elec-
tronic) based voting schemes. The issue was dis-
cussed in [10] in relation to Preˆt a` Voter. The solution
proposed in [10] was to make use of helper organi-
sations [1] to verify the digital signature to prevent
the system from discrediting voter challenges by pro-
viding false signatures. However, this approach may
prove to be too expensive and infeasible on a large
scale.
Below we provide a brief overview of the funda-
mentals of Preˆt a` Voter. In Section 2 we will give
further details of how not verifying the digital signa-
ture could lead to an attack against the system and
provide a further discussion on why the digital signa-
ture alone does not provide the properties required.
In Section 3 we discuss why the acknowledgement
code scheme used in Pretty Good Democracy (PGD)
1[13][5] is not applicable to Preˆt a` Voter in its current
form and hence justify why an alternative approach
is required. We discuss our new approach in Sec-
tion 4, which allows a voter to verify by herself, in
the polling station, that her vote has been recorded
as cast, without the need for digital signatures or
checking on a WBB. In Section 5 we discuss some
of the wider implications of using such a scheme and
additional compromises that have to be made.
1We compare to PGD because of the similarity between
the two schemes — primarily that PGD uses a randomised
candidate ordering in certain settings.
1.1 Overview of Preˆt a` Voter
Preˆt a` Voter is an end-to-end verifiable voting system.
There have been various different varieties proposed
over the years, with various different enhancements
and capabilities for handling different types of elec-
tion methods. Preˆt a` Voter can handle both plurality
and ranked elections, using a unified interface. One of
the key features of Preˆt a` Voter is that the ballot form
is perforated down the middle, with a left hand side
containing the candidate list and the right hand side
containing the voter selection and a barcode. When a
voter comes to vote with Preˆt a` Voter she fills in her
preferences on the right hand side, whether it be an
‘X’ or a series of rankings. She then tears down the
perforation and destroys the left hand side. The right
hand side is then scanned by the system and submit-
ted to the Web Bulletin Board, which produces a dig-
itally signed receipt that is returned to the voter. In
addition, the candidate list is in a randomised order
for each ballot. It is this randomised ordering that
is stored, in encrypted form, inside the barcode on
the right; this encrypted value is known as an onion
due to the multiple layers of encryption. These mul-
tiple layers of encryption are performed by different
trusted parties, which means a voter only needs to
trust a single one of the trusted parties to act hon-
estly, for the secrecy of their vote to be protected.
In order to count the votes each layer of the onion is
peeled off (decrypted) by the relevant trusted party
and the votes mixed, in a mix net, to ensure secrecy.
Once all the layers have been decrypted the original
candidate ordering can be reconstructed and the vote
read and added to the count. At this point the vote
has been through the mix net and thus cannot be
connected with the original vote cast, ensuring vote
secrecy. There are various audit measures in place to
provide integrity assurances and allow the voter to
verify that the mixing and decryption has been per-
formed honestly. A voter is able to check that her
right hand side is present on the Web Bulletin Board
by entering her serial number into a website, which
will return the relevant right hand side. As part of
the auditing process a voter or any other interested
party can then check that all the encrypted votes that
were on the Web Bulleting Board were submitted to
the mix network. A list of the key properties of Preˆt
a` Voter and a sample ballot form can be found in
Appendix A.
2 Weaknesses of the Digital
Signature and potential At-
tacks
In the current Preˆt a` Voter system [10] the digital
signature aims to protect two different parties, the
WBB and the voter. The WBB is protected from a
voter creating a fake receipt and then claiming that
the WBB has cheated and thus wrongfully under-
mining the election. The voter is protected from the
booth or WBB recording her vote incorrectly. Whilst
the digital signature does not prevent the incorrect
recording in itself, it provides the voter with the re-
quired evidence to successfully challenge the voting
system should something have gone awry2. However,
this is dependent on the voter receiving a valid digital
signature.
2.1 Verifying the Digital Signature
When the voter receives the digital signature on her
receipt she has no way of verifying that it is authen-
tic or that it contains the correct information. The
signature scheme itself is not human verifiable and
the embedding of the signature in a 2D barcode pre-
vents the voter from even reading its contents. Only
by using some computing device is the voter able to
verify the signature. However, she cannot use the
voting machine (or scanner device) because it can-
not be trusted and could be the party that is cheat-
ing. It therefore needs to be some form of trusted
hardware, or third party, that provides the verifica-
tion of the signature. As was mentioned in [10] voters
would need additional assistance in polling stations to
check the signature. The use of helper organisations
2 It has been proposed in [11] that the right hand side is
franked to provide proof it was submitted in addition to a digi-
tal signature. The details of how this might be achieved would
require further investigation. Its security properties would rely
on the physical nature of franking, in contrast to the approach
proposed in this paper.
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was the method proposed in [10]3, an alternative ap-
proach would be the use of a trusted application on
a voters’ mobile phone. In the case of using mobile
phones in the polling stations this is not compliant
with election law, or good practice, to encourage the
use of mobile phones and photographic equipment in
this setting. Therefore it is not practical to use a
mobile phone to verify the signature. Trusted third
parties attending all polling stations to provide ver-
ification services to voters is also not practical: the
cost for third party organisations to provide such ser-
vices would be very high when coverage of all polling
stations is required.
2.2 Attacks against the system when
the signature is not verified
The obvious question is “what are the consequences
of not being able to verify the digital signature?” The
answer is that it provides three possible attacks, one
from each party involved: the voter, the booth and
the WBB. An attack mounted by the WBB is virtu-
ally identical to that mounted by the booth. How-
ever, the WBB attack can be mitigated by requiring
the booth to verify the digital signature received from
the WBB. Thus, to successfully mount the WBB at-
tack would require both the WBB and the booth
to be compromised. Since the same effect can be
achieved by just attacking the booth there seems lit-
tle mileage in exploring a more complicated attack
that does not provide a greater pay-off. We have
therefore omitted details of the WBB attack and only
discuss the voter and booth attacks.
2.2.1 Booth Attack
One of the key properties of the Preˆt a` Voter scheme
is that the voting booth4 need not be trusted. As
such, any misbehaviour by the voting booth should
be detectable and provable. However, if the voter
3Note that in this case it may be necessary not only to have
one third party organisation in each poll station but several
independent organisations so that the voter can select one or
more that she trusts.
4This is the term used for the Preˆt a` Voter scanning equip-
ment used to scan and submit encrypted votes and to receive
and print receipts.
cannot verify the digital signature on the receipt then
it is possible for the booth to cheat and in turn accuse
the voter of being malicious. The booth can change
the vote cast and if it is not able to do this in an
informed way5 then it can still certainly randomise
the votes. The booth then has the choice of putting
the valid signature, returned from the WBB, which
is for the changed vote that the booth submitted on
behalf of the voter, onto the receipt or replacing the
signature altogether with invalid data. In both cases
it is not possible to detect whether the booth, the
WBB or the voter is the source of the invalid signa-
ture. Thus it is not possible to determine whether
the vote is genuine or not and the digital signature
scheme becomes irrelevant.
2.2.2 Voter Attack
The voter is able to create a new receipt and trans-
fer a valid digital signature from a valid vote to this
invalid receipt. Because she is not able to verify the
digital signature at the time of voting (before leaving
the polling station) she can claim that the receipt was
created by the electronic voting system6. The WBB
and booth have no evidence to indicate that they
acted honestly and therefore cannot contest the ac-
cusation. Whilst the voter does not have sufficiently
strong evidence to prove cheating (in that she can-
not even identify who it is that has cheated) she can
undermine the system.
The general problem is that the digital signature
cannot be verified at the time of voting and as a result
it cannot be challenged at a later stage. This leads
to ambiguity that results in an inability to prove who
is cheating and this opens the system up to the po-
5This may seem like an inconsequential attack because the
booth does not know the contents of the vote and can only
stage a randomisation attack. However, in real world elections
the votes are not evenly distributed within constituencies and
are typically clustered in regions within the polling district
around particular polling stations. Therefore randomisation
attacks are particularly effective in certain polling stations that
are in areas that favour a specific party, thus influencing the
final outcome. Furthermore, we here assume that full per-
mutations are used and not merely cyclic shifts as this leaks
information useful in this attack [12].
6It is this same weakness that allows the booth and WBB
to conduct their attacks.
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tential attacks. What is required is an alternative
authentication scheme that is verifiable by the voter
at the point of receipt, without the need for trusted
third parties or hardware. In Section 4 we propose
such a scheme.
3 Human Verifiable Authenti-
cation Scheme
The principles behind a human verifiable authentica-
tion scheme are well established, in particular when
used as acknowledgement codes in schemes such as
Pretty Good Democracy (PGD) [13][5]. However,
it is not possible to merely implement the same ac-
knowledgement code schemes in Preˆt a` Voter. The
acknowledgement code scheme used in PGD is con-
nected to the use of code voting and the construction
of the code voting ballot. Whilst some of the methods
are transferable to Preˆt a` Voter, it is not possible to
make a wholesale transfer of the PGD acknowledge-
ment code scheme to Preˆt a` Voter. In Section 3.1 we
shall discuss why we cannot just utilise the proposed
methods in PGD in Preˆt a` Voter. Instead, our goal
is to produce an equivalent acknowledgement code
that provides guarantees both that the vote has been
received by the WBB and it has been recorded as
intended. Another approach to introducing a PGD
style confirmation code into Preˆt a` Voter is given in
[9].
3.1 Applying PGD ACK codes to
Preˆt a` Voter
We wish to maintain the existing Preˆt a` Voter front-
end. Whilst we acknowledge that we will need to
provide additional features on the ballot form, we do
not wish to change the fundamentals of how the voter
interacts with the system, therefore ruling out the use
of a fully code voting approach. That is not a criti-
cism of code voting or PGD, just a desire to maintain
the fundamental Preˆt a` Voter approach. In this sec-
tion we shall describe the problems that arise if we
were to make a wholesale transfer of the PGD ac-
knowledgement scheme to Preˆt a` Voter. The attacks
and weaknesses described here are only relevant when
the PGD acknowledgement scheme is used with Preˆt
a` Voter, they are not applicable to PGD.
In the original Pretty Good Democracy proposal
[13] only single preference based voting schemes could
be used, for example First Past The Post (FPTP).
PGD is an enhanced form of Code Voting that pro-
vides additional verifiability. A voter receives a bal-
lot form containing a list of candidates and a cor-
responding vote code for each candidate. To cast a
vote the voter submits the relevant vote code for her
chosen candidate, or a series of vote codes for ranked
elections. In [13] there is a single acknowledgement
code also printed on the ballot form, this acknowl-
edgement code is returned by the WBB to provide
assurance the vote has been recorded. In [5] the ap-
proach is further expanded with a number of differ-
ent protocols that involve multiple acknowledgement
codes and randomised candidate orderings. We dis-
cuss why these approaches are not transferrable to
Preˆt a` Voter in more detail below.
In [13] the single acknowledgement code is gen-
erated from the vote code. Since we are not using
the code voting front end the single acknowledgement
code could not be calculated. Even if we found an al-
ternative way to calculate the acknowledgement code
it would not provide the guarantees required since the
single acknowledgement code cannot encode the po-
sition of the submitted vote, thus allowing the booth
or WBB to switch vote position.
An approach to using PGD for more expressive vot-
ing schemes was proposed in [5], in the form of three
different protocols.
Protocol A proposes using a unique acknowledge-
ment code for each candidate. However, it relies on
the voter submitting each rank separately and wait-
ing for the appropriate code to be sent back. This
could be applied in single preference votes in Preˆt
a` Voter, since the act of submitting the right hand
side is equivalent to submitting just a first preference.
However, for ranked elections it is not applicable,
since the entire vote is submitted as one whole. If the
vote is submitted as a single entity the booth or web
bulletin board (WBB) can switch the preferences and
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still return a seemingly valid set of acknowledgement
codes. This is due to the booth/WBB learning all of
the relevant ACK codes. Since Preˆt a` Voter is de-
signed to work for both single preference and ranked
elections, we need an approach that is applicable in
both. Having alternative schemes for different elec-
tions is possible, but the feature of a unified front-end
is a nice property of Preˆt a` Voter that we would like
to preserve.
Protocol B requires the voter to submit her vote
codes in preference order. The voter receives the can-
didates in a random order and also receives a list of
preference acknowledgement codes. This would ini-
tially appear to be applicable to Preˆt a` Voter, since
the vote is submitted as a single whole and the con-
struction of the ballot papers seems similar, with the
randomised candidate order. However, this approach
is also open to manipulation by the booth and WBB.
The reason this works in the PGD scheme is that
the mapping between candidate and preference or-
der is kept secret. In Preˆt a` Voter the candidate
to preference order is revealed when the voter sub-
mits the vote — due to the vote being submitted in
the random order they appear on the ballot form,
as opposed to preference order. As such, the booth
and WBB can learn all the information they need
(order and acknowledgement code) to switch prefer-
ences around, whilst maintaining a seemingly valid
acknowledgement code.
Protocol C proposes the use of a matrix of vote
codes. This is obviously not applicable for Preˆt a`
Voter, however, an approach using a matrix of ac-
knowledgement codes could be. This would provide
unique acknowledgement codes for each candidate in
each possible preference, thus preventing the switch-
ing around of acknowledgement codes. However, such
an approach is likely to be too cumbersome and dif-
ficult for the average voter to use.
The acknowledgement schemes described in [5] are
not fully transferable to Preˆt a` Voter, in particular
when handling ranked elections, and therefore a new
approach must be devised. Since it is not known
how to provide a human verifiable digital signature,
we will have to rely on some form of acknowledge-
ment code in order to provide the same properties
we want from the digital signature. As we have seen
above we cannot simply apply an existing acknowl-
edgement code scheme, since it is either too complex
(in the case of matrix style PGD) or not secure. We
therefore propose a new alternative acknowledgement
code called Authentication Codes for Preˆt a` Voter.
4 A New Approach
It is intended that the scheme proposed here is stan-
dalone and independent of the digital signatures and
WBB check. In Section 5.3 we shall discuss some of
the potential problems in keeping a WBB check in
the light of unverified digital signatures.
The Authentication Code consists of a string of
digits, some of which are the rankings that the voter
has given to the candidates and the rest being random
digits. Looking at the Authentication Code without
an indication about which digits are those rankings,
it should be hard to accurately guess which the rank-
ing digits are. The voter can create the Authentica-
tion Code by simply filling out a few empty boxes on
an Authentication Strip given to her together with
the ballot form and the voting system then essen-
tially proves to her the correct recording of her vote
by giving the code back to her separately — the Au-
thentication Code becomes a secret shared between
the voter and a set of peer WBBs. This is achieved
through distributed homomorphic cryptography, for
example the Paillier cryptosystem [8][4], and redun-
dancy in the Authentication Code. In the follow-
ing sections we shall discuss the Authentication Code
scheme from the various different perspectives, giving
an overall picture of how it works.
4.1 Overview of Approach
In this section we will provide a brief description of
the desired properties of each component and any as-
sumptions we make. We require an Authentication
Code that the voter can compute by hand without
needing to trust hardware or individuals. It should
not be possible for either the WBB or booth equip-
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ment to provide a forged Authentication Code that
the voter will accept, even if they know the submitted
encrypted vote and computed Authentication Code.
The Authentication Code will be constructed by the
Election Manager, the same authority who constructs
the ballot forms in Preˆt a` Voter. It is assumed that
the Election Manager is honest and is destroyed fol-
lowing the construction of the ballot forms and Au-
thentication Codes. The Authentication Strip will
be sealed inside a tamper evident envelope with the
corresponding ballot form. A voter should reject any
envelope that appears to have been tampered with.
This does lead to a greater chain of custody require-
ment, which we discuss further in Section 5.2. The
WBB peers construct shares of the complete Authen-
tication Code, but it is only after the public com-
bining step that the final Authentication Code is
learned. The Authentication Code shares and Au-
thentication Values are stored in encrypted form by
the WBB peers. As such no single peer should be
able to learn a partial Authentication Code or Au-
thentication Value. The Authentication Code should
be checked and either accepted or challenged whilst
still within the booth, once a voter leaves the polling
station no further challenges can be made. If the
voter is not happy about the received Authentication
Code she should be able to withdraw her vote and
cast another.
4.2 The Voter Perspective
It is imperative that the voter experience is simple
and easy to follow and this is why the voter’s task
is limited to merely writing down her vote in the ap-
propriate boxes and comparing two lists of numbers.
There is an implicit chain of custody related to the
ballot form and more importantly the Authentica-
tion Strip. In Preˆt a` Voter [2][11][10] the chain of
custody of the ballot form protects the secrecy of the
vote. With the addition of an Authentication Strip
the chain of custody also protects the integrity. The
implications of this additional burden on the chain of
custody is discussed in Section 5.2. One way of help-
ing to verify and maintain the chain of custody is to
enclose the ballot form and Authentication Strip in a
tamper evident envelope. The voter collects her bal-
Figure 1: Example Authentication Strip
lot form and also receives the Authentication Strip as-
sociated with that ballot form (most likely contained
in a single tamper evident envelope). This Authenti-
cation Strip contains a list of numbers with n blank
boxes, where n is the number of candidates. Once the
voter has completed her ballot form she writes down
the preferences into the blank boxes on the Authen-
tication Strip. Where there is no preference (no rank
assigned to a candidate) a zero is entered in the box
on the Authentication Strip. Figure 1 shows how an
Authentication Strip would be filled in, with the voter
simply transcribing her vote into the empty boxes in
the Authentication Code.
Having completed this stage the standard Preˆt a`
Voter scheme continues with the voter submitting her
right hand side. It is important that the Authenti-
cation Strip is kept secret7 prior to the scanning and
7A particular danger would be if the Authentication Strip
became known to an attacker who had subverted scanning
equipment or the WBB or anyone conspiring with such an
attacker.
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Figure 2: Example Receipt
submission of the vote. The receipt received back
from the WBB, and printed by the booth, contains
the candidate ranking as normal and also a copy of
the completed Authentication Strip, as shown in Fig-
ure 2. The voter can then check that the two strips
match exactly: the Authentication Code that she cre-
ated on her Authentication Strip by transcribing her
vote matches the Authentication Code printed on her
encrypted receipt. If the codes match then the voter
can be sure that the vote has been recorded as it was
cast. If they do not, the voter can immediately chal-
lenge the election and she should not accept that her
vote has been included in the tally unless the Au-
thentication Codes match exactly8.
8If she leaves the polling station with non-matching Au-
thentication Codes she has forfeited her right to challenge the
election at a later time.
4.3 The Election Manager Perspec-
tive
The Authentication Code is a series of randomly per-
muted values with n (where n is the number of can-
didates) blank spaces added. To create the Authen-
tication Code the Election Manager takes the list of
values between 0 and m (where m = n in ranked
voting and m = 1 in single choice voting) plus the
blank space (denoted φ) and randomly permutes and
concatenates these values n times.
For example, with n = 4, the values 0,1,2,3,4,φ are
randomly permuted 4 times9
20φ314, φ14203, 2041φ3, φ21304
and concatenated into a list of 24 digits10:
20φ314φ142032041φ3φ21304
Having generated this random list of digits, the po-
sitions of the blank spaces are extracted:
3, 7, 17, 19
At each location 0 is inserted.
200314014203204103021304
The next stage is to create the individual Authenti-
cation Values for each candidate. The first candidate
Authentication Value corresponds to the first blank
location, the second candidate Authentication Value
to the second blank location and so on. To create
the Authentication Value a string of zeros is created
that is the same length as the Authentication Code,
for example:
000000000000000000000000
The zero in the location of the first blank location
generated above is replaced with a 1.
001000000000000000000000
9Herem = n because ranked voting is used. We have chosen
n = 4 as an arbitrary example.
10There may be a more optimal way of generating this Au-
thentication Code that would allow it to be shorter, but ini-
tially we shall use this approach since the blinding effect will
become obvious. We use the value 4 as an example of an elec-
tion with 4 candidates.
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This forms the first Authentication Value. This is
repeated for each candidate:
000000100000000000000000
and
000000000000000010000000
and
000000000000000000100000
These Values, along with the Authentication Code
itself, are then encrypted under the WBB public key
EPKwbb(200314014203204103021304)
EPKwbb(001000000000000000000000)
EPKwbb(000000100000000000000000)
EPKwbb(000000000000000010000000)
EPKwbb(000000000000000000100000)
and copies of all encrypted Authentication Codes and
Values, with references to ballot form serial numbers,
are copied to all WBB peers.
4.4 The Web Bulletin Board Perspec-
tive
Unlike the existing digital signature scheme, a single
WBB does not produce the Authentication Code by
itself. We envisage the use of a distributed WBB, ei-
ther with a central website that handles contact with
all the peers or an entirely peered WBB network.
WBB peers (who hold the distributed private key
shares) jointly construct the Authentication Code.
In short, as there are several parties involved no sin-
gle party ever knows what the Authentication Code
is (before it has been issued) and therefore cannot
cheat. The construction of the peered WBB is out-
side the scope of this paper, but we include the details
on the construction of the Authentication Code.
The WBB, as it has been extensively described in
literature, has a table that links the serial number of
the ballot form to the relevant ciphers[10]. We ex-
pand this table to also include an encrypted Authen-
tication Code and individual Authentication Values
for each of the candidates. Both the Code and the
Values are encrypted under the WBB public key11
and are created by the Election Manager during the
setting up procedure for the election. This means
that after completion of the setting up procedure a
threshold set of the WBB peers must work together
if they wish to decrypt the Authentication Code or
Values.
4.4.1 Receiving a Vote
In the structure with a central distributor com-
municating with WBB peers, the central distribu-
tor records the vote and then notifies each of the
peers that an Authentication Code needs to be con-
structed. Each peer than takes a copy of the submit-
ted vote from the central distributor and commences
the Authentication Code construction. In the sce-
nario where there is no central distributor and it is
entirely peered, each of the WBB peers will receive
the vote separately and will be able to commence
construction of the Authentication Code themselves.
To construct the Authentication Code each WBB
peer performs the following steps:
1. The list of rankings made by the voter, with ze-
ros inserted wherever no ranking or selection is
made, is received. Continuing the example from
above the vote is
3, 1, 2, 0
2. The list of encrypted Authentication Values is
retrieved from the peer’s own database and each
Value is homomorphically scaled by the corre-
sponding ranking.
EPKwbb(003000000000000000000000)
EPKwbb(000000100000000000000000)
EPKwbb(000000000000000020000000)
EPKwbb(000000000000000000000000)
11The corresponding private key is shared in a threshold
fashion, each share held by a WBB peer.
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3. Each of the Authentication Values are homomor-
phically added
EPKwbb(003000100000000020000000)
with the Authentication Code
EPKwbb(200314014203204103021304)
resulting in a single, encrypted Authentication
Code:
EPKwbb(203314114203204123021304)
4. The peer performs a partial decryption (with
corresponding proof of decryption) of the Au-
thentication Code that it has constructed using
its private key share.
5. The partial decryption and the proof of decryp-
tion are published.
Once a threshold set of peers have provided their
partial decryptions the public combining step is per-
formed and the decrypted Authentication Code is
recorded and returned to the booth and voter.
4.4.2 Election Process
As with most schemes the technology alone does
not provide enough to handle the inherently unpre-
dictable nature of people, we also need processes and
standard operating procedures to cover a wider vari-
ety of situations. In such a process we set out what
each party’s responsibilities are and how disputes are
resolved. The voter has the responsibility of check-
ing that the Authentication Code matches the one
on the Authentication Strip. If it does not she must
challenge the election at that point, before leaving
the polling station. The leaving of the polling sta-
tion is an implicit acceptance of the vote shown by
the Authentication Code. This is necessary to pre-
vent a malicious voter leaving the polling station and
fabricating a fake receipt and then attempting to un-
dermine the election.
4.4.3 Security Discussion
When looking at the security of the Authentication
Code we must look at what has to be undertaken in
order to attack it. The primary goal of any attacker,
be it a booth or WBB, would be to return a valid
Authentication Code, whilst recording a different re-
sult. If this was achieved it would allow the cheating
component to return a valid Authentication Code to
the voter, who would accept it and leave the polling
station. Once the voter has left she cannot challenge
the result based on her Authentication Code alone
— she is dependent on the write once aspect of the
WBB. This is due to the malicious voter problem dis-
cussed above. As such the cheating component would
get away with the cheating by diverting blame onto
the voter.
Given the Authentication Code and a single voter
preference, changing the code to another valid code
to match a different preference cannot be achieved
with better than 50% probability (as there are, for
example, two 1’s to choose from). In ranked voting,
correctly guessing each preference would have an as-
sociated 50% probability and thus the chance of cor-
rectly guessing and changing all preferences would
decrease exponentially with the number of prefer-
ences changed.12 Furthermore, the chance of success-
fully changing many votes, without being caught, de-
creases exponentially with the increasing number of
votes changed. It is clear that the WBB itself and the
peers cannot cheat individually, since they are oper-
ating in the encrypted domain and do not see the
Authentication Code until it is publicly combined.
They could make random changes but given the level
of redundancy in the Authentication Code they are
far more likely to make a detectable change than get
away with it.
If an individual WBB tries to record a different
vote preference the proof of partial decryption will
not hold. If the central WBB distributes an incorrect
preference the Authentication Code will not match
12These are worst case probabilities, in most cases the prob-
ability of correctly guessing the locations is far smaller, for
example 25%. An example of where the worse case scenario is
applicable would be where a voters preference is removed or
an additional preference is added.
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the one the voter has.
4.5 Short Code Alternative
The method proposed above results in a code length
that grows quadratically with the number of can-
didates. This is obviously undesirable, particularly
in elections with large numbers of candidates. In
smaller elections this is not so much of an issue, since
it is still quite manageable with 3 to 4 candidates.
Ideally we would like to have a code that grows lin-
early with the number of candidates. In this section
we will propose such an approach. The back-end pro-
cessing is identical and the principle stays the same.
However, the front-end involves a further level of indi-
rection. The change to the front-end involves permut-
ing the position of each candidate’s “blank location”.
Recalling the original scheme, the blanks were in the
same order as the ballot form (top most candidate
related to top most blank). This extra level of indi-
rection means we can reduce the number of elements
we need to blind the voter’s preference. However, it
does require the voter to do some additional work in
locating where she needs to write in her preference
values on the Authentication Strip.
The code length is thus given by the equation
2n + 1, where n is the number of candidates. The
reason for requiring the additional 1 is to include
a blinding 0 value to handle partial rankings and
FPTP. This results in a code that at worst has a 1/2
chance of an adversary guessing the location of any
particular value. This chance worsens when trying to
guess multiple partial ranking locations or in FPTP.
However, the code length can be further generalised
to adjust the chance of guessing. The code length
can then be given by n+(p−1)(n+1) where p is the
1/p probability of guessing any particular value.
In order to make it easy for the voter to make the
link between the candidate preference box and the
location of the corresponding blank in the Authenti-
cation Strip the relevant boxes are labelled. In this
example we have used letters to label the boxes, but
any form of image or text could be used, depending
on cultural sensitivities. Figure 3 shows a ballot and
Authentication Strip for the Short Code variant.
The comparison step for evaluating the Short Code
Figure 3: Example Short Code Authentication Strip
Figure 4: Example Short Code Receipt
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variant is the same as before, however, the code is
now considerably shorter.
4.5.1 Short Code Construction
The construction for the Short Code shares a number
of the same steps as before, but due to the shorter
length and additional permutation we explain it sep-
arately below.
To create the Short Code variant the Election Man-
ager takes the list of values between 0 and n (where
n is the number of candidates) plus n blank spaces
(denoted φ) and randomly permutes this list. For ex-
ample, with n = 4, the values 0,1,2,3,4,φ,φ,φ,φ are
randomly permuted
φ20φ31φ4φ
Having generated this random list of digits, the po-
sitions of the blank spaces are extracted:
1, 4, 7, 9
At each location 0 is inserted.
020031040
The next stage is to create the individual Authenti-
cation Values for each candidate. The first candidate
Authentication Value corresponds to the first blank
location, the second candidate Authentication Value
to the second blank location and so on. To create
the Authentication Value a string of zeros is created
that is the same length as the Authentication Code,
for example:
000000000
The zero in the location of the first blank location
generated above is replaced with a 1.
100000000
This forms the first Authentication Value. This is
repeated for each candidate:
000100000
and
000000100
and
000000001
These values, along with the Authentication Code
itself, are then encrypted under the WBB public key.
The Authentication Values at this point refer to n
labels in canonical form (A,B,C,D).
EPKwbb(020031040)
EPKwbb(100000000)(A)
EPKwbb(000100000)(B)
EPKwbb(000000100)(C)
EPKwbb(000000001)(D)
The next step requires us to create a random indi-
rection mapping. We randomly permute the labels
associated with each Authentication Value:
EPKwbb(020031040)
EPKwbb(100000000)(D)
EPKwbb(000100000)(A)
EPKwbb(000000100)(C)
EPKwbb(000000001)(B)
This permuted list of letters is printed to the left
of each empty position on the Authentication Slip, as
shown on Figure 3. The final step is to then reorder
the Authentication Values to the canonical order of
the letters that correspond to the labels.
EPKwbb(020031040)
EPKwbb(000100000)(A)
EPKwbb(000000001)(B)
EPKwbb(000000100)(C)
EPKwbb(100000000)(D)
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Each candidate position on the ballot form13 is la-
beled alphabetically starting with A.
The Authentication Code and the Authentication
Values, in their permuted order, are then stored onto
the WBB peers.
4.5.2 Short Code Receiving a Vote
The process undertaken on receipt of a vote is iden-
tical to that in Section 4.4.1. This is because the
permuted Authentication Values will modify the rel-
evant part of the completed Authentication Code. As
such, the WBB peers do not need to know what the
permutation is, because it is dealt with during the
homomorphic addition.
5 Discussion
In this section we will further discuss some of the
issues raised during the description of construction
and use of the Authentication Code. This section
aims to pose some open questions whose answers are
still open to debate and discussion.
5.1 Usability
We believe the short code variant to be more usable,
even though there is an additional level of indirec-
tion. However, the advantage of the shorter code we
believe outweighs this. Both schemes have been im-
plemented using the Paillier cryptosystem [4] and are
at proof of concept stage. We intend on conducting a
wider usability analysis in future Preˆt a` Voter trials.
There are a number of usability properties to evalu-
ate. For example, whether numerical representations
are the most desirable as opposed to letters or sym-
bols. Additionally, whether in plurality schemes we
should use blanks to represent ‘0’ and ‘X’ to represent
‘1’. We aim to explore these further in the future. It
should be noted that such modifications do not im-
pact on the security of the scheme, they are purely
related to usability and accessibility.
13Note that this is the positions from top to bottom on the
form: in Preˆt a` Voter the position on the form does not cor-
respond to a particular candidate as the candidate list is in a
random order on each form.
5.2 Chain of Custody
In Section 4.2 we briefly mentioned the greater
burden on the chain of custody when including
an Authentication Code. In the existing Preˆt a`
Voter schemes, which involve pre-constructed ballot
forms, the chain of custody is required to protect the
secrecy of the vote. If an adversary is able to gain ac-
cess to the ballot forms he will be able to record the
candidate ordering and uncover how a voter has voted
from the receipt. With the addition of an Authen-
tication Code the chain of custody is also required
to protect the integrity of the election. If an adver-
sary is able to gain access to the Authentication Strip
he can use knowledge of the locations of the blanks
to then corrupt a scanning machine to be able to
produce forged Authentication Codes. Various tech-
niques can be used to try and maintain the chain of
custody and allow the voter to verify that it has been
maintained. For example, tamper evident envelopes
would help in this regard. Whilst it is clearly undesir-
able to have a greater burden on the chain of custody,
it would appear to be unavoidable. The chain of cus-
tody problem is evident in all schemes using precom-
puted acknowledgement or confirmation codes.
It should be noted that the removal of trust
in opaque devices is a key component of Preˆt a`
Voter and since the secrecy of Preˆt a` Voter is based on
the chain of custody of the secret ballot forms, pro-
viding a higher level of assurance by keeping another
piece of paper in the same sealed envelope seems only
a marginal extra risk. Merely breaking the chain of
custody of the Authentication Code does not imme-
diately break the integrity of the voting system, only
secrecy is broken and that has been compromised al-
ready by the attacker seeing the ballot form. The at-
tacker must also subvert the booth device to perform
an attack on a single vote. Without our contribution,
subverting the device would potentially allow the at-
tacker to perform the attack on all votes cast through
that device; with our contribution the attacker must
also break the chain of custody of the Authentication
Code for each vote.
A possible way to improve the situation would be
to allow the voter to construct her own Authentica-
tion Codes in an out-of-band fashion. Thus allowing
12
a voter to have verifiable communication with the
peered WBB without having to trust the chain of
custody of the Authentication Strip. This forms part
of our future work, but would result in a significant
departure from how Preˆt a` Voter currently works.
5.3 Issuing Receipt and the WBB
Check
The provision of an Authentication Code provides
the voter with a guarantee that her vote has been
recorded by a threshold set of WBB peers, assuming
that the chain of custody of the Authentication Strip
has been maintained. It is natural to then question
whether a receipt, with or without a digital signa-
ture, should be still be issued and thus whether the
checking of the WBB by the voter should still be re-
quired.
It is often advocated that maintaining the issuing
of the receipt and the WBB allows the voter to ver-
ify that her vote is correctly recorded. However, as
was discussed in Section 2.2 this is only true if the
signature is being verified. Since we are unaware of
any practical way of allowing the voter to verify the
digital signature, what are the implications of still
issuing the receipts? It would appear that contin-
uing to issue the receipts allows a malicious voter
to continue to maliciously undermine the voting sys-
tem. The data being provided by the WBB cannot
be demonstrated to be genuine, even if it is. There-
fore the system as a whole does not have a defense
against malicious voters. Since a voting system is
only of use if it is trusted, providing an avenue for
malicious voters to potentially undermine the trust
in the voting system seems unwise. Whilst removing
the receipt and WBB check is a significant departure
from the Preˆt a` Voter scheme, it may well provide
better protection for the system as a whole, without
any loss in terms of security.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have identified the need for an ad-
ditional, or possibly alternative, method for a voter
to verify that her vote has been recorded as cast. We
have proposed a new acknowledgement scheme en-
titled Authentication Codes that provides a human
verifiable technique for verifying the accurate record-
ing of the vote. We have identified possible weak-
nesses related to the chain of custody of acknowledge
code based schemes in general and discussed possible
techniques for mitigating the problem.
7 Future Work
A combinatorial analysis of the length and construc-
tion of the Authentication Code may allow the length
of the code to be shortened, particularly in the case
of single preference voting.
The proposed approach will reveal the number of
candidates that the voter has included in her rank-
ing. This is an underlying problem in Preˆt a` Voter as
it currently stands, since that information is posted
to the WBB and printed on the receipt. It could be
solved by including an additional STOP candidate
and then requiring full ranking. However, the usabil-
ity of such an approach would need to be carefully
evaluated. The Authentication Code itself does not
reveal any additional information than the underly-
ing Preˆt a` Voter system.
To limit the reliance on the chain of custody of the
ballot forms with their corresponding Authentication
Strips, it may be possible to devise a scheme whereby
Authentication Codes are created out-of-band, initi-
ated by the voters themselves. A voter, in the privacy
of her own home, visits the election website and se-
lects the option to create an Authentication Code.
Running software on the election authority’s server,
on a trusted third party’s server or on the voter’s
own computer, an Authentication Code with corre-
sponding Authentication Values are created as de-
scribed above, all encrypted under the public key
of the WBB peers. The encrypted Authentication
Code and Values are copied to the WBB peers and
the voter prints the Authentication Strip on her own
printer. The printed sheet contains a barcode with
the serial number of the Authentication Code. When
the voter allows her Preˆt a` Voter vote to be scanned
in the polling station, she also allows the barcode of
the Authentication Strip to be scanned — only the
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barcode should be scanned, the Authentication Strip
itself must be kept secret. On the receipt printed by
the voting system is the Authentication Code that
the voter created herself. This does create a possible
coercion issue, in that a coercer could request to see
a voters Authentication Strip and then require a par-
ticular completed Authentication Code to appear on
the WBB. This would allow a randomisation attack
to be undertaken. However, the same can already
occur in Preˆt a` Voter if the coercer requests to see a
receipt with particular preference ordering on it.
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A Preˆt a` Voter Overview
Figure 5 contains a sample ballot form for the Preˆt
a` Voter system. Whilst the exact rendering of the
ballot form may vary between versions, the funda-
mentals remain the same. Those fundamentals are
as follows:
• Ballot form consists of a left and a right hand
side perforated from top to bottom down the
middle
• Left hand side contains the candidate list in a
random order
• Right hand side contains the voting boxes, serial
number and a barcode
• The barcode contains an “Onion” that is an en-
crypted representation of the randomised candi-
date list
• The right hand side is scanned by a machine in
the polling station and submitted to a Web Bul-
letin Board (WBB)
• The WBB returns a receipt with a copy of the
right hand side on it and a digitally signed copy
of the submitted values
• The right hand side is published to a publically
accessible WBB
• The voter can check their right hand side is
present on the WBB by entering the serial num-
ber on their receipt/right hand side
• At the close of the election all the right hand
sides on the WBB are submitted to the mix net
and then finally decrypted and counted. (The
exact methodology used depends on the election
system and the version of Preˆt a` Voter being
used.)
Figure 5: Example Preˆt a` Voter Ballot Form
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